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Conrad’s Secret Sharer at the Gate of Hell*
Thomas Dilworth

[204] The immense popular and critical interest in ‘The Secret Sharer’ has generated since
publication in 1910 testifies to the poignancy of its human drama. But its impact is due as much
to narrative technique as the centrality of theme. Conrad's narrative method, influenced by the
literary impressionism developed in collaboration with Ford Madox Ford, stresses the subjective
revelation implicit in the narration of remembered experience. The story’s recollected landscape
and descriptive detail disclose the narrator’s point-of-view to such an extent that his sea yarn
becomes a symbolic account of a journey through the narrators own interior space. It is because
of the secret or hidden nature of such a journey that the story poses so many problems. The
importance of Leggett the significance of other characters, the meaning of the head Leggatt
leaves behind, his ghostly aspect, the apparently unnecessary nearness of the ship’s approach to
the island of Koh-ring: none of these can be understood apart from moral awareness of man
recollecting them.
Analysis of the narrator’s character and the significance for him of what he recalls have
been made by means of mythic analogues and the gleanings of modern psychology. But
conclusions reached in this way tend to neglect the narrative’s quidditas or particularity—for,
however helpful myths and psychological theory, may be, they remain, for the most part, outside
Conrad’s known interests and external to the story’s field of reference.

First published as ‘Conrad’s Secret Sharer at the Gate of Hell,’ Conradiana IX (1977), 203-17. Original page
numbers are yellowed in square brackets. I have made slight improvements in the writing. My thanks for permission
to republish online to Conradiana’s editor, John Peters, and Joanna Conrad of Brill Publishing, email 9 Aug. 2022.
*

To determine what happens and why in the narrator’s personal inscape, the reader might
do well to scan again the story’s images for possible allusions, elusive evocations, and
suggestions which previously may have gone unnoticed. Such scanning must, in a real sense, be
visual, for Conrad’s art engages primarily the visual imagination. In this story, moreover, the
features and posture of a person, the relative positions of figures in a defined space, and more
comprehensive, topological relationships are sometimes described with an exactitude and clarity
that gives to them the specific significance of visual puns. Such precisely defined images, taken
together, appear almost to pantomime aspects of the invisible, unconscious drama taking place in
the young captain’s psyche. Furthermore, those allusive images establish for this interior drama a
significant background of analogue and typology by reference to Conrad’s known interests,
notably works by Rodin, Dante, and Baudelaire.
[206] The physical passage of the ship and the interior journey of its captain
simultaneously each their most critical moment at the end of the story in the tacking maneuver in
the shadow of Koh-ring. This towering black island is identified by the narrator with the entrance
to Hades: ‘the very gate of Erebus,; ‘the gate of … everlasting night,’ ‘the very gateway of
Erebus.’1 The image may suggest death, but it is uncertain whether mortal danger threatens
anyone on board a ship which, if the helm is not shifted at the right time, will merely continue to
drift toward the island at a virtually imperceptible speed in a sea said to be as smooth as glass.
The worst the narrator anticipates is the ruin of his career. As he puts it, ‘the only future for
which I was fit, would perhaps go irretrievably to pieces in any mishap to my first command’
(135). But the fearsome name he gives the island must refer to more than the possible loss of a
vocation. The suspense and tension of the young captain’s interior struggle, evident especially in
his relation to the others on deck, appear to be of greater moment—however obscure the nature
of his struggle may be.

1 Rodin, Porte de l’Enfer (Plaster model, 1880-1917), Musee d’Orsee, Paris

Erebus or Hades, besides suggesting death, signifies hell. In particular, the narrtor’s

phrase ‘gate of Erebus’ calls t mind the title of Auguste Rodin’s monumental Porte de l’Enfer, a
‘Gate of Hell’ that might afford an entrance into the secret experience the captain shares with
Leggatt. The Porte de l’Enfer, twenty-one feet high and thirteen feet wide, portrays on a large
scale the suffering caused y human passion. Its two main panels depict in pulsating rhythms the
tension, conflict, anguish, and despair of figures caught in a swirling sea of bronze. Over this
painful chaos, in the centre of the door’s tympanum, broods the introspective figure of ‘The
Thinker.’ Certain similarities between this presiding figure and Leggatt suggest that Rodin’s
sculpture exercised a formative influence on Conrad’s story.2

2 Detail, Rodin, Porte de l’Enfer (Plaster model, 1880-1917), Musee d’Orsee, Paris

Leggatt, as the narrator describes him, is pre-eminently a thinker. In the young captain’s
cabin he resembles a monk in meditation, ‘sitting rigidly on the low stool, his bare feet close
together, his arms folded, his head hanging on his breast’ (115). At other times he reclines ‘on
the floor, his legs bent, his head sustained on one elbow (127), resembling the melancholy
brooder of Gray’s ‘Elegy’ and numerous romantic etchings whose prototype lolls in Milton’s ‘Il

Penseroso.’ In physical appearance, Leggatt resembles Rodin’s The Thinker. He is under twentysix years of age, well-built, with a dark brow and a square forehead. His expression is that of The
Thinker, his face ‘sunken … his eylids lowered under the stern dark line of his eyebrows drawn
together by a slight frown’ (114). At the narrator’s first clear view of him, Leggatt’s nakedness
and posture are particularly evocative of Rodin’s naked form: the narrator recounts, ‘I … saw the
naked man from the sea sitting on the main-hatch, glimmering white in the darkness, his elbows
on his knees and his head in his [207] hands.’ The description continues, ‘His expression was
concentrated, meditative, … such as a man thinking hard in solitude might wear’ (100). Later, in the
cabin, Leggatt sits ‘for hours’ ‘on the camp-stool’ remaining ‘perfectly still’ (115, 127). His stillness is

statuesque: ‘to find him sitting so quietly was surprising, like something against nature,
inhuman’ (136). His habit of motionlessness was doubtless acquired during his six weeks of
solitude aboard the Sephoraafter the storm in which he saved the ship and killed a shipmate; he
tells the narrator, ‘I had had time to think all those matters out several times over.’ And his host
can readily imagine ‘the manner of this thinking out’ (106).
The probability of Leggatt’s being based at least partly on The Thinker is strengthened by
Conrad’s having visited Rodin in 1896, when he would have seen for himself the full-scale
plaster version of the Porte de l’Enfer, which had ben virtually complete for ten years.3
Furthermore, Rodin was well-known and his work well-publicized. In a letter dated 31 May
1902, Conrad associates himself with ‘Rodin the Sculptor’ as being among those contemporaries
whose work has achieved some degree of popular recognition. By the time ‘The Secret Sharar’
was written in Novembeer 1909, the sculptor was the most famous artist alive. In 1903 he had
succeeded Whistler as president of the International Society of Painters, Sculptors and
Engravers. In 1907 he had received an honourary degree from Oxford and the following year
was visited at his studio-home at Meudon by the King of England. The ‘Gate of Hell,’ which had
become his life’s work, had by then acquired a widespread reputation as a work-in-progress. Its
exhibition at the Paris International Exposition of 1900 was reported by the News and Courier of
18 June, which stated that ‘Twenty years of ceaseless toil have completed this apotheosis of
suffering.’ Five years later, the November issue of the Architectural Record notes that it has not
yet been cast in bronze. The portal’s presiding figure, however, had been enlarged and cast,
receiving the name Le Penseur from foundry workers who noticed its resemblance to Il
Penseroso, Michelangelo’s statue of Lorenzo de Medici. The workers’ title was adopted by

everyone, including Rodin. On 27 April 1905, The Thinker was set up in a conspicuous position
before the Panthéon. It seems improbable, in light of Rodin’s notoriety and the publicity given
his work, that Leggatt-the-thinker, who bears notable resemblance to Rodin’s Thinker, should
have been situated by Conrad in any proximity to a symbolic ‘gat of Erebus’ without the author
giving some thought to the sculptor’s ‘Gate of Hell’ or, as seems more probable, his deliberately
alluding to Rodin’s great work.
The meaning of the Porte de l’Enfer, and its consequent significance for Conrad’s story,
derives largely from the main literary and artistic models that informed its creation. Rodin’s
‘Gate’ was inspired by the Inferno of The Divine Comedy. But instead of the moralistic,
hierarchical demarcations of Dante’s hell, the Porte displays the swirling chaos of the infernal
[208] poems in Les Fleurs du Mal, a work Rodin began to read in 1878 and eventually
illustrated. The interior location and personal nature of Baudelaire’s hellscape suggests what is
perhaps obvious to anyone looking at the Porte de l’Enfer, that the passionate suffering depicted
on its panels is what absorbs and afflicts the mind of The Thinker. Whether or not Conrad was
conscious of the influence of Dante and Baudelaire, their works were of course known to him
and, as we shall see, have some affinity with aspects of ‘The Secret Sharer.’
The form of Rodin’s ‘Gate’ derives from and alludes to the traditional iconography of the
Last Judgment a depicted on various cathedral portable—notably Notre Dame’s door of the
Judgment—and in the sculptured pilaster of Orvieto Cathedral, in Michelangelo’s fresco in the
Sistine Chapel, and in painting by Tintoretto, Rubens, Blake, and others. In all these works,
Christ, whose body is usually larger than the figures he judges, occupies an elevated and central
position in the composition. In Rodin’s work, this place is occupied by ‘The Thinker,’ who is
larger than those he presides over. Not that he is a Christ-figure; rather, Christ-as-Judge is
supplanted by self-conscious man who, as man, not only judges but himself comes under
judgment, if only his own.
If the theme of judgment informs the ‘Gate,’ it also permeates Conrad’s story, judgment
in two senses: as considered opinion and as ‘crisis’ (he Greek word meaning judgment. There are
two judgments in the latter sense: the tempest in which Leggatt’s heroic and homicidal acts are
committed, and the maneuvering of the narrator’s ship in the shadow of Koh-ring. Leggatt
implies that the second of these crises will be a sort of judgment when he says he intends to
escape ‘Not naked like a soul on the Day of Judgment. … The Last Day is not yet’ (132). And he

remarks of the first crisis aboard the storm-tossed Sephora, ‘I suppose the end of the world will
be something like that’ (124). It is this ‘last day’ in the gale that lives in Legggatt’s memory as
the swirling inferno of Rodin’s door preoccupies the mind of its ‘Thinker.’
The stormy apocalypse aboard the Sephora is for Leggatt an enduring revelation of the
irrational power of uncontrolled passion, the same ‘strung up force’ that set the saving foresail
and, ‘in a sot of recoil,’ killed the rebellious crewman (125). Homicidal rage so displaced
Leggatt’s rational consciousness that he retains no memory of intent: ‘It’s clear that I meant
business,’ he says, ‘because I wa holding him by the throat still when they picked us up’ (pl
102). In his account of the misadventure, the sea reflects the force of irrational passion in a
manner that recalls Baudelaire’s image o the sea as mirror of the human spirit in ‘L’Homme et la
Mer.’ In ‘a sea gone mad’ (124), all the men of the Sephora lost their reason. ‘Just as an awful
sea made for the hip,’ Leggatt closes with the crewman ‘half-crazed with funk (102). For over
[209] ten minutes the two of them were swirled together by the torrent swamping the deck—like
figures caught in the liquid chaos of Rodin’s Porte. When the water cleared, the pair, still linked
by Leggatt’s grip on the dead man’s throat, were carried aft by the crew ‘screaming “Murder!”
like a lot of lunatics’ to the captain who joined in the ‘raving,’ having been driven ‘out of his
mind’ by the gale (102-3). Previously the captain’s fear and despair had so overwhelmed his
rational faculties that he had not only failed to order the foresail set but, in his conversation later
with the narrator, does not recall having failed to give the order—just as the hero of Lord Jim
cannot recall his actually having jumped from the crippled Panta. Of the Sephora’s captain,
Leggatt comments, ‘Devil only knows what the skipper wasn’t afraid of (all his nerve went to
pieces altogether in that hellish spell of bad weather …) (107, my italics).
All the Sephora’s men broke under tha strain of crisis, each according to his temperament
and circumstances: Leggatt fell into blind rage, the captain into fearful despair and, with his men,
into irresponsible mob hysteria. But the unanimity of weakness evident in their common failure
goes unacknowledged in ensuing conscious judgments. Only Leggatt is blamed—for murder, of
which he is rightly acquitted by himself and the narrator. Leggat’s homicidal act was not
intended in full consciousness and, per se, entails little if any moral guilt. It seems doubtful,
moreover, that a court of law would have convicted him of manslaughter, as one reluctantly did
his prototype in real life who, in less extenuating circumstances, killed a crewman aboard the
Cutty Sark. Not that Leggatt is innocent; his culpability is simply not the sort to be discerned by

a court of law. As he says to the narrator, ‘you don’t see me coming back to explain such things
to an old fellow in a wig and twelve respectable tradesmen, do you? What can they know
whether I am guilty, or not—or of what I am guilty either’ (131-2)? Leggatt’s act of homicide is
symptomatic of what Marlow, in Lord Jim, calls an ‘infernal alloy’ in a person’s metal and what
Melville in Billy Budd calls the ‘flaw in the universe.’ Leggatt’s act is an epiphany of this
universal flaw. It shatters the comfortable illusions men entertain about themselves ad reveals a
measure of the darkness of heart Kurtz declares at the end of his life to be ‘the horror.’ It is
precisely the radical nature and universality of the darkness that compels the crewmen of both
ships and the Sephora’s captain to condemn Leggatt so harshly. In order to avoid self-awareness
that would diminish self-esteem, they dissociate themselves from the living medium of
revelation.
The judgment that effects this insulating estrangement emerges from a superficial
consciousness typified by the narrator’s chief mate, who is Leggatt’s counterpart both in rank
and as thinker (but not in temperament: in that respect he is like the Sephora’s captain). ‘His
dominant trait [is] to take all things into earnest consideration.’ ‘Of a pain-taking [210] turn of
mind,’ he likes, in his own words, ‘“to account to himself” for practically everything’ (94).
Occasionally his expression takes on ‘a thoughtful cast’ (122). His manner becomes ‘grave,
preoccupied ….as though he were in possession of some perplexing intelligence’ (125). Unlike
Leggatt, however, he is no meditator; in the mate, ‘a dreamy, contemplative appearance’ is
nothing more than ‘a mark of perplexity’ (134). His manner of thinking is exclusively pragmatic
and devoid of insight into human motivation. He correctly deduces the nature and situation of a
strange ship but is unable to ‘account for’ the ‘whims’ of the self-embittered second mate. He is
bewildered by the modus operandi of a scorpion that board ed the ship, crawled into is room, and
‘managed to drown itself’ in his inkwell (probably mistaking it for a hole to hide in).
Significantly his reconstruction of the scorpion’s activity parallels his account of n argument
about Leggatt. Members of a visiting party from the Sephora insinuate that the fugitive is being
hidden aboard the ship. The chief mate recounts his indignant shipmates’ response: ‘“As if we
would harbour a thing like that. … Wouldn’t you like to look for hij in our coal-hole?’” and the
chief mate concludes, ‘I suppose he did drown himself’ (123). In effect, the mate and the
crewmen absolve themselves by reducing Leggatt’s nature to that of ‘a thing,’ as though evil
were somehow subhuman and therefore beneath them. Leggatt, in short, becomes their

scapegoat. For this reason also, the Sephora’s captain Archbold is ‘under the pitiless obligation’
not only to surrender Legatt to the law but to treat him as a willful murderer. Only in this way
can he prolong what he considers ‘seven-and-thirty years at sea, of which over twenty [were] of
immaculate command’ (118). And like the narrator’s chief mate, Archbold is willing to believe
in Leggatt’s suicide—assuming perhaps that such a monster might well be driven by guilt to
execute himself.
In their refusal to acknowledge in themselves any innate inclination to moral weakness in
the face of passion, the chief mate, Archbold, and the crewmen idealize human nature. This
paradoxically minimizes humanity; man is made over implicitly at least in the image of an
animal or mechanism which if incapable of great evil is also incapable of love. The assumption
that the criminal Leggatt is less than human is, in Baudelaire’s words, ‘only the consequence of
the great modern heresy of the artificial doctrine substituted for the natural doctrine—I mean the
suppression of the idea of Original Sin.’4 The artificial doctrine is that of Rousseau, which might
be termed the idea of Original Virtue.
Leggatt himself may have accepted unquestioningly the post-romantic minimization of
man’s immoral (and moral) potential. His crime, at any rate, indicates that he had not effectively
come to terms with his passions. Only [211] after he has killed does he acquire in meditation a
conscious awareness of the essential amorality of human passion and an effective determination
to control it—much as T.S. Eliot’s Sweeney, by killing a girl, gains in guilt a knowledge that
terminates for himself what Eliot calls the ‘cheery automatism of the modern world.’
Leggatt’s references to himself as a Cain-figure are admissions of guilt. They also
suggest the dark ambiguity within every human, which conditions personal relationships. In a
letter opposing Cunninghame Graham’s liberal sentient that human fraternity is synonymous
with love, Conrad writes on 8 February 1898, ‘Fraternity means nothing unless this Cain-Abel
business.’ Leggatt’s homicide is a perverse assertion of human brotherhood. As he himself puts
it, he played Cain to the rebellious cewman’s ‘unworthy Abel’—his uncontrolled anger
mirroring the latter’s irrational spite. Like elicited like until, identical in their active fraternity,
killer and victim resembled Siamese twins as they were carried together the length of the deck,
linked physically by Leggatt’s unbreakable strangle-hold. Distracted from the evil within by the
enemy without, Leggatt became a killer. But he discovered in the process that if his victim was
an ‘ill-conditioned snarling cur,’ neither is he himself ‘an angel from heaven’ (101).

The motif of mirror reflections that informs the narrator’s early descriptions of his
relationship with Leggatt suggests that the young captain too (in addition to Leggatt’s victim) is,
in some respect, Leggatt’s twin. No doubt physical similarity, common background, and the
sympathy these generate serve to motivate the young captain to undertake the interior journey
that the other seamen refuse to risk. The direction of this inner journey is, however, determined
by the one thing lacking in his resemblance to Leggatt: moral self-awareness, which the latter has
acquired ass a result of his violent act and his six weeks of meditation.
The extent to which the captain lacks this awareness is suggested y his first look at
Leggatt, which, when considered as one of the story’s mirror reflections, discloses more about
the captain than the swimmer. To the former, putting his ‘head over the rail,’ Leggatt seems at
first ‘a headless corpse’ (97). Headlessness suggests unconsciousness, but not, in retrospect at
least, of Leggatt, who by this time has become a thinker. Insteead, the captain, looking down into
the water as Narcissus did, sees a symbolic reflection of himself. At the same time, Leggatt sees
above him ‘a man’s head looking over’ (110). The combined effect from the two points of view
is, paradoxically, of bodily unconsciousness and disembodied consciousness—in other words, of
a mind existing in almost Cartesian disjunction from the physical passionate half of its humanity.
As the narrator himself later realizes, ‘I was somewhat of a stranger to myself’ (93).
[212] That the young captain lacks self-knowledge is suggested initially by his wondering
whether he will ‘turn out faithful to that ideal conception of one’s own personality every man
sets up for himself secretly (93). Entertaining this ideal self-concept, he rejoices naively ‘in the
great security of the sea,’ in his ‘choice of that untempted life presenting no disquieting
problems’ (96). Idealism that precedes or precludes self-awareness is inevitably imaginary and
self-deceptive: as is the literary heroism of Jim’s fantasies, the romantic-heroic self-image of
Nostromo, Razumov’s concept of himself as an autonomous, rational man, and the ethical
idealism of the young Kurtz and his Intended.
The alternative to false ideaaalism is not a more realistic ideal but the steadfastness of an
integrated personality. The young captain initially seeks an ‘untempted life.’ Marlow, in Lord
Jim (London: Dent, 1947), proposes instead a courageous
Ability t look temptations straight in the face—a readiness unintellectual enough, goodness knows, but without
pose—a power of resistance, … ungracious if you like, but priceless—an unthinking and blessed stiffness before
the outward and inward terrors, before the might of nature, and the seductive corruption of men—backed by a

faith invulnerable to the strength of facts, to the contagion of example, to the solicitation of ideas. Hang ideas!
(111)

This controlled strength of will Leggatt manifests during the time he is hidden by the young
captain. Leggatt, ‘haggard as he apeared’ to his host, ‘looked always perfectly self-controlled,
more than calm—almost invulnerpable’ (127). When he is nearly discovered by the steward,
Leggatt causes the rattled captain to marvel ‘at that something unyielding in his character which
was carrying him through so finely’ (131). Leggatt’s will derives its strength not from an ideal
conception of his own personality but from his having experienced, and his wanting henceforth
to avoid, the hell of passion. Accordingly, for the narrator, Leggatt is not the embodiment of a
mental paradigm, someone simply to imitate. If he becomes the captain’s model, he is also in a
truer sense his guide.
Like athletic Hermes in ancient rites of initiation, Leggatt escorts the captain through an
underworld to gnosis. But this Hades Leggatt bears within himself. It is made present to the
captain in the course of the long whispered conversations through which he experiences
empathetically Leggatt’s struggle during the gale and profits from the meditation that filled his
prolonged solitude.
The relationship between Leggatt and the narrator as guide and follower, master and
initiate, has an analogue, at times strikingly close, in the relationship between Virgil and Dante in
the first sixty-one cantos of The Divine Comedy. In his role as thinker, Leggatt resembles Virgil,
the prototype of reason who provides for Dante a vicarious experience of hell in order to broaden
his understanding and strengthen his will toward good. In each work, the minds of guide and
initiate seem to merge in a process whose completion is marked by the abrupt disappearance of
the guide—as though his wisdom has been fully assimilated by his disciple. Leggatt parts from
Conrad’s narrator at the mountainous island of Koh-ring, which is reminiscent of the islandmountain of Purgatory, where Virgil leaves the narrator of the Commedia. And if Leggatt goes
‘to take his punishment’ (149), so does Virgil, who is consigned to hell’s first circle because he
was ‘a rebel against [God’s] law’ (Inferno I, 125). Furthermore, Virgil’s being a shade from
Hades may account for Leggatt’s being referred to as a ‘grey ghost (103), ‘as noiseless as a ghost
(114), raising ‘irresistible doubt of his bodily existence (130). Leggatt’s remark, ‘It would never
do for me to come to life again’—which ‘was something that a ghost might have said’ (131)—is
evocative of Virgil’s remark about his being ‘Not man, once I was man’ (Inferno I, 66). Leggatt

the ghost, like Virgil, is a shade whose proper habitation is Hades, albeit a Hades located in the
mind as memory and as future possibility. Conrad may well have intended these parallels with
The Divine Comedy. After all, the Inferno had been the original inspiration for Rodin’s Porte de
l’Enfer, which, in its final form, retains representations of several figures from Dante’s Inferno.
That Conrad often called the Commedia to mind is indicated by imagery he employs in a letter to
Cunninghame Graham (6 Dec. 1897), by quoting in Italian the phrase inscribed on hell’s door,
lasciate ogni speranza, in a letter to A.H.D. Davray (22 août 1903), and by explicit allusions to
Dante’s hell in Romance (Part Four, Ch. 10) and Heart of Darkness.
Near the conclusion of ‘The Secret Sharer,’ the captain’s acquisition of Leggatt’s
knowledge is completed in his total empaty with Leggatt—when, anticipating the fugitive’s
plight, the young captain pictures himself wandering bareheaded under the sun and
spontaneously transfers his hat to Leggatt’s head. This empathy is, for the captain, selfintegrating. It is sealed, as it were, by the dangerous tacking maneuver in the shadow of Kohring. The captain’s interior condition issues in this act because what he now knows cannot be
circumscribed exclusively by the mind but must engage the whole man—mind and emotion,
head and body. The nautical maneuver, a matter of ‘conscience’ which, he says, compels him to
go ‘thus close—no less’ (141) cannot be reduced to merely practical motivation. It can only be,
simply, for Leggatt’s sake—a gratuitous act prompted by love and gratitude, since the
knowledge he has acquired is not merely information but exists in their relationship.
The captain’s daring act marks the final dissolution of the self-alienating image of an
ideal self that had kept him rom complete engagement with the realities of life. As Conrad writes
to Edward Garnett (March 1896), [214]
When once the truth is grasped that one’s own personality is only a ridiculous and aimless masquerade of
something hopelessly unknown, the attainment of serenity is not very far off. Then there remains nothing but
surrender to one’s impulses, the fidelity to passing emotions which is perhaps a near approach to truth than any
other philosophy of life. And why not? If we are ‘ever becoming—never being’ then I would be a fool if I tried
to become this thing rather than that: for I know well that I never will be anything.

The risk involved in letting go, in surrendering to impulse, is very great—as Leggatt’s
experience demonstrates. If, however, such surrender is judicious, it need not counteract what
Marlow praises as an innate power of resistance in the face of temptation. Moreover, a leap of
faith lies at the bottom of any free, personal decision or involvement. And the narrator’s
relationship with Leggatt culminates, as it began, in spontaneity.

Stein in Lord Jim discusses ‘how to live’ in imagery that sanctions such surrender and reenforces the role of Leggatt, the exeprt swimmer, as model for the young captain. Stein speaks of
life as a sea into which man is born
If he tries to climb out into the air as inexperienced people endeavor to do, he drowns .. No! I tell you! The way
is to the destructive element submit yourself, and with the exertions of your hands and feet in the water make the
deep, deep sea keep you up…. In the destructive element immerse. (214)

In the shadow of Koh-ring, the young captain takes the plunge.
The ship’s approach to the island is, in words Conrad useses in A personal Record
(London:Dent, 1947) of an experience of his own, the final act of an ‘initiation (through an
ordeal which requires some resolution to face) into the life of passion’ (ix). At first the narrator’s
ordeal seems to duplicate that of Leggatt, who had to perform a difficult nautical maneuver and
deal with an insolent crewman—a ‘snarling cur’ ‘simmering all the time with a silly sort of
wickedness’ (101). The counterpart to the man Leggatt killed is the narrator’s recalcitrant second
mate, given to ‘sneering’ and jeering remarks. As the ship draws into the island, he questions the
narrator’s orders. But before the crisis, he is replaced at the narrator’s elbow by the whiskered
chief mate, and the young captain is faced not with the insubordination and rage that overcame
Leggatt and for which he may be prepared, but with the enervating despair that debilitated
Leggatt’s captain. Again the nature of the crisis is reflected by the sea in a manner described by
Baudelaire, in the sestet of ‘La Musique,’ the last two lines of which provide the epigraph of The
Shadow-Line:
Je sens vibrer en moi toutes les passions
D’un vaisseau qui souffre,
Le bon vent, le tempête et sens convulsion
Sur l’immense gouffre
Me bercent. D’autres fois, calme plat, grand mirroir
De mon désespoir!

[215] The sea is absolutely still, and the chief mate, seeing the looming island, moans, makes a
‘shadowy gesture of his despair,’ cries out, ‘Lost!’ and rants at his captain:
She will never get out. You have done it, sir. I knew it’d end in something like this. She will never weather, and
you are too close now to stay. She’ll drift ashore before she’s round. O my God! … She’s ashore already. (1401)

The narrator controls his chief mate by gripping his arm and rigorously shaking it, a gesture at
once evocative of and significantly different from Leggatt’s throttling grip on his victim’s throat.

But the fear controlled by the narrator’s subdued violence is not solely that of his chief mate; he
himself acts, as he recalls, not daring to ‘look towards the land lest my heart should fail me’
(141). By controlling the mate’s despair and his own, he exercises courageous resistance before
the outward and inward terrors, reversing the arch-cowardice of the captain remembered
ironically as Archbold.
The source of the narrator’s courage is his compassion. His fearful mate, by contrast,
replied earlier to his complaint about feeling ill ‘without showing any great concern (129).
Timorous Archbold likewise responds ‘without the least sympathy’ (116) when told by the
narrator that he was nearly deaf. And Archbold was ‘pitiless’ in his determination to deliver
Leggatt to the law. The narrator, on the contrary, is bound to Leggatt, involved in his suffering,
by ‘pity,’ as he calls it—the same pieta experienced by Dante in the Inferno and Purgatorio
which keeps him from being merely a tourist. Compassion indicates an intuition of the
fundamental communion between people, which, for Conrad, is the basis of at. In the preface to
The Nigger of the ‘Narcissus’ (London: Dent, 1923), he writes that the artist
Speaks … to the latent feeling of fellowship with all creation—and to the subtle but invincible conviction of
solidarity that knits together the loneliness of innumerable hearts, to the solidarity … which binds men to each
other, which binds together all humanity. (viii)

The captain’s compassion for Leggatt increases his understanding of humanity and
involves him in a ‘fellowship with all creation’ that contrasts with the narrow communion he felt
and lost at the opening of the story when, as he recounts,
I as alone on her decks. There was not a sound in her—and around us nothing moved, nothing lived … with
tropical suddenness a swarm of stars came out above the shadowy earth, while I lingered yet, my had resting
lightly on my ship’s rail as if on the shoulder of a trusted friend. But, with all that multitude of celestial bodies
staring down at one, the comfort of quiet communion with her was gone for good. And there were also
disturbing sounds by this time—voices, footstep forward. (92-3)

His initial communion with the inanimate ship was disrupted by starlight and the sounds of men.
It was a relationship contingent on estrangement [216] from humanity and, as the stars suggest,
from the universe and (with all its metaphysical implications) the heavens. The images of
starlight and the sounds of men that destroyed this impossibly narrow, inhumane communion
recur, significantly, during the final episode under the ‘enormous mass of blackness’ that the
narrator calls the ‘gate of Ereus.’ The island-mountain blocks out the stars in the sky and seems
to impose silence; ‘there was not a gleam to be seen, not a sound to be heard’ under ‘the great

shadow gliding closer … without light, without sound’ (139, 140). Now as before, the sensory
void is filled suddenly by starlight and sound. As the ship turns and the mountainous gate of hell
falls away, the stars re-emerge, seeming to glide ‘from right to let’ while the foreyards run
‘round with a great noise, amidst cheery cries’ of crewmen (143). The captain resembles Dante
emerging from hell ‘to see again the stars’ and ‘to course over better waters.’5In a reversal of his
previous reaction to starlight and clamour, he now feels ‘the perfect communion of a seaman
with his first command’ (143), a broadly based communion now including his crew and men at
large.
Leggatt is the means by which the narrator achieves this new communion. The name
Leggatt, if it is a pun like ‘Archbold,’ may indicate that the fugitive is a legate or envoy
promoting unity. The name may also derive from an Italian word of a different Latin root,
legare, to bind or restrain—the past participle of which is legate. The word is used throughout
the Inferno as a metaphor for the condition of the fallen soul. The sinner is said to have failed
because of ‘some vital obstruction that binds,’ the shades have ‘their hands tied’ (legate), their
‘limbs bound’ (legate), the soul itself is bound, its neck is bound. In the Paradiso, Dante is
warned against allowing emotions to bind the intellect. Leggatt’s reason had been bound in this
way, and his unbreakable grip on his victim’s throat signified the ambivalent fraternal bond that
is common human nature. As a prisoner, Leggatt was physically restrained. He became selfrestrained once he understood his passionate nature. The captain, in empathetically becoming
Leggatt, likewise becomes legato, exercising courageous self-constraint at the gate of Erebus. As
Conrad writes in The Mirror of the Sea (New York: Doubleday, 1932), ‘faithfulness is the great
restraint, the strongest bond laid upon the self-will of men and ships on this globe of land and
sea’ (110).
Paradoxically, the fugitive who I, in several senses of the word, legato, when he leaves
‘to take his punishment,’ is said by the narrator to be ‘a free man, a proud swimmer striking out
for a new destiny’ (143). The statement is no sentimental assertion that Leggatt will live happily
ever after. The swimmer possesses profound self-awareness in which exile is not at odds with
freedom but freely undertaken—like the suffering in the Purgatorio’s mountain, where Danta
and human souls go eagerly ‘to seek liberty’ (I, 71).

The final symbolic restoration to the captain of his hat, left by Leggatt in the water, has
its Dantesque parallel not in the Inferno but, appropriately, in the Purgatorio. Virgil’s last words
to Dante before disappearing are:
No longer expect word or sign from me: free, right and whole us
your will, and it would be a fault not to act according to its
judgement; therefore I crown and mitre you. (XXVII 139-42)

The learning process of secret sharing has issued in a ritual commencement. In place of an
imperial crown or episcopal mitre, the narrator receives not a captain’s hat, which would bee a
comparable symbol of authority, but an ordinary ‘floppy hat’ that any man might wear—the
symbol of his compassion, by which he has come to understand something of what it is to be a
human being.
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Note on author: This was the first published of over 130 articles and chapters on Romantic and Modern literature
and the relation between visual art and literature by Thomas Dilworth, who became a Distinguished Professor at the
University of Windsor, Ontario, a fellow of the Royal Society of Canada, a Killam Fellow, an H.D. Fellow (Yale), a
senior fellow of the David Jones Society, a winner of the British Council Prize in the Humanities, and the editor or
author of a dozen books, most recently (the author of) David Jones, Engraver, Soldier, Painter, Poet.

NOTES
1

Joseph Conrad, ‘Twixt Land and Sea (London:Dent, 1947), pp. 140, 142, 143. Page reference to this text

appear hereafter in parenthesis. Erebus, the ante-chamber of Hades, is regularly used as a synonym for Hades: vid
Odyssey X, 528, XI, 564; XII, 81; Aeneid 1V, 26; VI, 247, 404; VII, 140.
2

The Porte de l’Enfer was commissioned by the Beaux Arts committee in a lettere dated 17 July 1880,

requestion Rodin to execute a door decorated with ‘bas-reliefs drawn from the cantos of Dante’ (vid. Rodin’s letters
in the Beaux Arts file of the national Archives, Paris). The full scale plaster model was virtually complete and in its
present form by 1886, acording to a description by Felicién Champsaurin Le Figaro Supplément, 16 Jan 1886. For a

thorough account of the sculpture’s conception and genesis, see Albert E. Elson’s Rodin’s Gate of Hell
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1960).
Jessie Conrad mentions accompanying her husband to ‘a reception by M. Rodin’ in what she says weere

3

‘the early days of our marriage’ (Joseph Conrad and his Circle [London: Dutton, 1935], p. 240). That would almost
certainly have been sometime between their arrival in France in March of 1896, soon after their wedding, and their
departure six months later. The author and his wife undoubtedly saw the Porte at Rodin’s studio, where he regularly
received his visitors on Saturdays (vid. Charles Bartlett, ‘A Visit with Rodin,’ American Architecture and Building
News, 25 May 1899, 240.
4

Baudelaire quoted by Robert Benoit Cheris, Commentaire des Fleurs du Mal (Genova, 1949), p. 12.

5

These images mark a major turning in the Commedia, deriving as they do from the last line of the Inferno

and the first line of the Purgatoria.

